30 August 2020

HTML5 Games On Android

On my last hollidays, I made two HTML5 games, and published on android market. Nowadays javascript has powerful libraries for doing almost everything, and also there are several compilers from java or c code to javascript, converting opengl c code to html5 canvas, but definitely, javascript execution is slower than dalvik applications, and of course much slower than arm c libs. For improving the speed of sounds and images loader, I have used javascript asynchronous execution and scheduling priority has been controlled with setTimeout/setInterval which deprioritize or priorize a code block. This games are published on the android market here: Android Planets and here: Far Planet More information

Blockchain Decentralized Application Hacking Course - A Journey Into Smart Contract Hacking And DApp Penetration Testing (Web 3.0)

Smart Contract Exploitation and Hacking Course Announcement

What Is this:

For those who have been hitting me up on twitter and YouTube for more blockchain smart contract exploitation content this blog is for you. I have posted a video below explaining what this is and included a course outline of the content we are providing free for everyone. I was actually told recently that I am crazy for giving out this level of detailed content and training for free.. However, I believe in the original hacker ethic code from long ago, that information should be freely available for everyone!! In this frame of mind, the only pay for content will be if you wish to go the extra mile. For the person who wants to prove to themselves or others that they learned something via a certification package with detailed exam prep targets and guides, followed by a final exam CTF and reporting write-up.

So I hope you enjoy this content. The content and walk through labs will be all free. This content will be posted regularly over the next few months 90% of it is already written and ready to go.

We will start off with the differences between Solidity and other languages and do a quick coding overview before we start hacking. This way everyone is on the same page when we start looking at coding examples of vulnerable targets or reviewing case study code. Then we will cover a wide range of typical issues that effect decentralized applications(DApps) and smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain. How to spot them and exploit them with full walk-through style learning. Subjects we have already released (Re-Entrancy, Integer Attacks, Authorization) have been updated with new code, new examples, and case studies etc. Some of the learning content will be the same but with a lot of newly added content. And in the case of Authorization completely re-written and expanded on.

Basically this course was created to get the information out there in a clear concise way. Because when I started researching blockchain hacking all I found was a paragraph here and there on something that was overly technical or completely theoretical. I couldn't find any clear concise learning or examples. This drove me nuts trying to figure everything out, until I gave up and just coded my own vulnerabilities and hacked them. So hopefully this fills the knowledge gap to offer a clear and concise, Zero Fluff resource to those on the same path.

CTF Exam:

If you do enjoy this series over the next few months and want to challenge your skills and certify that you learned something we will be also offering pay for certification bundle that includes Decentralized Application (DApp) targets and detailed lab guides as preparation for a final exam against a more comprehensive CTF certification challenge target. More info on this as the months progress.

Bug Bounty of Sorts:

These labs are completed but we are working on a way to deliver the content which requires me to code up a course delivery software. So feel free to hack the course delivery software once its up, if you break in or bypass authorizations I will give you the full course for free provided you help me fix it. :P

Pre- Requisites:

This is more of a intermediate / advanced course with a white box code approach to bug hunting and a dynamic approach to application hacking and exploiting targets, with that said you will need the following pre-requisites:

Ability to code in some language and understanding of coding concepts.
Application hacking or development background with firm understanding of vulnerabilities

Contact Info:

As this is free, I only ask that you provide constructive feedback as we are creating other more advanced hacking courses on random subjects we are interested in. Most of which will be free. And feedback helps us not do things which are not useful and integrate new ideas where they make sense.

Cheers and I hope this finds you well.

Twitter:

Email:

info@cclabs.io

WebPage:

Intro Video:

Course Outline / Release Order:

Orange = = Whats included additionally for the full course

Blue = = What will be released free in blogs / videos

(Mostly every Mondays) over the next few months

Building and Scoping Things

Chapter 1: Cliff Notes on Blockchain

Intro:

What is a Blockchain and how is it secured

Smart Contracts

What is a Decentralized Application (DApp)?

Diving into Blockchain Components:

Distributed Vs Decentralized

Provenance Use Case:

Consensus and Mining:

Hands on Lab - Blockchain Consensus walkthrough Lab

Summary:

References:

Chapter 2: Threat Modeling and Scoping Engagements

Architecture Considerations:

Business Logic Locations and Technology Decisions

Development Environments

Threat Modeling

Summary

References:

Chapter 3 – Solidity for Penetration Testers Part 1 (Hello World)

About Solidity

Hands on Lab - Remix interface overview

Structure of a Smart Contract

Hands on Lab – HelloWorld

Summary

References:

Chapter 4 – Solidity for Penetration Testers Part 2

Beyond Hello World

Hands on Lab – Code HelloWorld bank

Code Level Walk Through of HelloWorld Bank

Checks Effects Interactions:

Summary

Part 2: Hacking and Exploiting Things

Chapter 5 - Glass Half Full or Glass Half Empty: Integer Attacks

Underflows and Overflows

Withdraw Function Vulnerable to an underflow

Transfer Function Vulnerable to a Batch Overflow

Batch Overflow Code Explanation:

ERC20 Batch Overflow Case-Study

Walkthrough of The Vulnerable Function

Reviewing the Real Attack Transaction

Hands on Lab - Exploiting Our Own ERC20 Batch Overflow

Hands on Lab - Fixing the ERC20 Overflow

Exam Prep - DApp Target + Detailed Lab Guide

Hands on Lab -Safe Math Walk Through

Integer Attacks Summary

Integer Attacks References

Chapter 6 - You Again: Leveraging Reentrancy Attacks

Reentrancy Intro

Checks Effects Interactions Pattern

Simple Reentrancy Example Code

Passing the Checks:

Looping the Interaction:

Updating the Effects:

Attacking Code Example:

Hands on Lab - Attacking a Simple Reentrancy

Hands on Lab - Fixing the Checks Effects interaction Pattern

Send vs Transfer Vs Call.Value

Case Study – The Dao Hack

Exam Prep - DApp Target + Detailed Lab Guide

Reentrancy Summary

Reentrancy References

Chapter 7 Do You Have a Hall Pass: Access Control Attacks

Understanding Smart Contract Authorization and Visibility

Visibility:

Simple Visibility Example:

Implementing Authorization:

Example Walk-through of No Authorization

Thinking about Smart Contracts as unpublished API's for DApps

Case of the Video Game Heist

Enumerating functions in a contract

Hands on Lab - Directly Calling Public Functions with Web3

Hands on Lab - Example Fix with Simple Authorization

Exit Scam Warning

Hands on Lab - Example Fix-2 Using Modifiers for Simple Authentication

Hands on Lab - Example Using Openzeppelin for Role Based Access Control

Exam Prep - DApp Target + Detailed Lab Guide

Authorization Summary:

Authorization References

Chapter 8 - Dude Where's My Data: Storage Vs Memory Attacks

Intro - Not Written Yet – Up Next

Code Example - Not Written Yet – Up Next

Case study? - Not Written Yet – Up Next

Exploiting vulnerability - Not Written Yet – Up Next

Summary - Not Written Yet – Up Next

References - Not Written Yet – Up Next

Chapter 9 - Do I know you: TxOrigin vs Message.sender Attacks

What's the difference?

Man In the Middle Via tx.origin

Hands on Lab - Simple tx.origin Example Walkthrough

Hands on Lab - Vulnerable TX.Origin Example Walkthrough

Exam Prep - DApp Target + Detailed Lab Guide

Action steps to familiarize yourself with the contract:

Attack Options:

Summary

References

Chapter 10 - Who Am I: Delegate Call Attacks

How delegate calls work:

Delegate Call vs Call

Simple Delegate Call Example Code

Simple Delegate Code Example Walkthrough

Hands on Lab - Simple Delegate Example Walkthrough

Variable Memory Issues with Delegate Calls

DelegateCall Storage Simple Example Code

Hands on Lab - DelegateCall Storage Walkthrough

Exam Prep - DApp Target + Detailed Lab Guide

Case Study - Parity Wallet Attack:

Attack Transactions Explained

Dangerous fallback function using delegatecall

The Parity Wallet Code

Delegate Chapter Summary

Delegate References:

Chapter 11 - Look into My Crystal Ball: Bad Randomness Issues

Cryptographic Implementations and Predictable PRNGs

Simple BlockHash Example

Hands on Lab - BlockHash Vulnerability Walk and Talk

Exam Prep - DApp Target + Detailed Lab Guide

Preventing Randomness Issues

Bad Randomness Summary

Bad Randomness References

Chapter 12 - Automated Static Application Security Testing

Content - Not written - Up Next

Hands On Lab - Not written - Up Next

Summary Not written - Up Next

References - Not written - Up Next

Chapter 13 - CTF Exam

Final Exam and CTF Certification Exam Target

Final Exam Reporting

Appendices:

Appendix I – Pre-Requisite Suggestions:

Programming Pre-Requisites:

Web Application Hacking Pre-Requisites:

Appendix II – Other Blockchain Learning Resources and Certifications

Appendix III – Non-Exhaustive Scoping Questions

Appendix IV – Non-Exhaustive List of things to check for

29 August 2020

APT Hackers Exploit Autodesk 3D Max Software For Industrial Espionage

It's one thing for APT groups to conduct cyber espionage to meet their own financial objectives. But it's an entirely different matter when they are used as "hackers for hire" by competing private companies to make away with confidential information. Bitdefender's Cyber Threat Intelligence Lab discovered yet another instance of an espionage attack targeting an unnamed international

via The Hacker News

Attacking Financial Malware Botnet Panels - SpyEye

This is the second blog post in the "Attacking financial malware botnet panels" series. After playing with Zeus, my attention turned to another old (and dead) botnet, SpyEye. From an ITSEC perspective, SpyEye shares a lot of vulnerabilities with Zeus.

The following report is based on SpyEye 1.3.45, which is old, and if we are lucky, the whole SpyEye branch will be dead soon.

Google dorks to find SpyEye C&C server panel related stuff:

if the img directory gets indexed, it is rather easy, search for e.g. inurl:b-ftpbackconnect.png
if the install directory gets indexed, again, easy, search for e.g. inurl:spylogo.png
also, if you find a login screen, check the css file (style.css), and you see #frm_viewlogs, #frm_stat, #frm_botsmon_country, #frm_botstat, #frm_gtaskloader and stuff like that, you can be sure you found it
otherwise, it is the best not to Google for it, but get a SpyEye sample and analyze it

And this is how the control panel login looks like, nothing sophisticated:

The best part is that you don't have to guess the admin's username ;)

This is how an average control panel looks like:

Hack the Planet! :)

Boring vulns found (warning, an almost exact copy from the Zeus blog post)

Clear text HTTP login - you can sniff the login password via MiTM, or steal the session cookies
No password policy - admins can set up really weak passwords
No anti brute-force - you can try to guess the admin's password. There is no default username, as there is no username handling!
Password autocomplete enabled - boring
Missing HttpOnly flag on session cookie - interesting when combining with XSS
No CSRF protection - e.g. you can upload new exe, bin files, turn plugins on/off :-( boring. Also the file extension check can be bypassed, but the files are stored in the database, so no PHP shell this time. If you check the following code, you can see that even the file extension and type is checked, and an error is shown, but the upload process continues. And even if the error would stop the upload process, the check can be fooled by setting an invalid $uptype. Well done ...

        if ($_FILES['file']['tmp_name'] && ($_FILES['file']['size'] > 0))
        {
                $outstr = "<br>";
                set_time_limit(0);
                $filename = str_replace(" ","_",$_FILES['file']['name']);
                $ext = substr($filename, strrpos($filename, '.')+1);
                if( $ext==='bin' && $uptype!=='config' ) $outstr .= "<font class='error'>Bad CONFIG extension!</font><br>";
                if( $ext==='exe' && $uptype!=='body' && $uptype!=='exe' ) $outstr .= "<font class='error'>Bad extension!</font><br>";

                switch( $uptype )
                {
                case 'body': $ext = 'b'; break;
                case 'config': $ext = 'c'; break;
                case 'exe': $ext = 'e'; break;
                default: $ext = 'e';
                }
                $_SESSION['file_ext'] = $ext;
                if( isset($_POST['bots']) && trim($_POST['bots']) !== '')
                {
                        $bots = explode(' ', trim($_POST['bots']));
                        //writelog("debug.log", trim($_POST['bots']));
                        $filename .= "_".(LastFileId()+1);
                }
                if( FileExist($filename) ) $filename .= LastFileId();
                $tmpName  = $_FILES['file']['tmp_name'];
                $fileSize = $_FILES['file']['size'];
                $fileType = $_FILES['file']['type'];
                ## reading all file for calculating hash
                $fp = fopen($tmpName, 'r');

Clear text password storage - the MySQL passwords are stored in php files, in clear text. Also, the login password to the form panel is stored in clear text.
MD5 password - the passwords stored in MySQL are MD5 passwords. No PBKDF2, bcrypt, scrypt, salt, whatever. MD5. Just look at the pure simplicity of the login check, great work!

$query = "SELECT * FROM users_t WHERE uPswd='".md5($pswd)."'";

ClickJacking - really boring stuff

SQL injection

SpyEye has a fancy history of SQL injections. See details here, here, here, video here and video here.

It is important to highlight the fact that most of the vulnerable functions are reachable without any authentication, because these PHP files lack user authentication at the beginning of the files.

But if a C&C server owner gets pwned through this vuln, it is not a good idea to complain to the developer, because after careful reading of the install guide, one can see:

"For searching info in the collector database there is a PHP interface as formgrabber admin panel. The admin panel is not intended to be found on the server. This is a client application."

And there are plenty of reasons not to install the formgrabber admin panel on any internet reachable server. But this fact leads to another possible vulnerability. The user for this control panel is allowed to remotely login to the MySQL database, and the install guide has pretty good passwords to be reused. I mean it looks pretty secure, there is no reason not to use that.

CREATE USER 'frmcpviewer' IDENTIFIED BY 'SgFGSADGFJSDGKFy2763272qffffHDSJ';

Next time you find a SpyEye panel, and you can connect to the MySQL database, it is worth a shot to try this password.

Unfortunately the default permissions for this user is not enough to write files (select into outfile):

Access denied for user 'frmcpviewer' (using password: YES)

I also made a little experiment with this SQL injection vulnerability. I did set up a live SpyEye botnet panel, created the malware install binaries (droppers), and sent the droppers to the AV companies. And after more and more sandboxes connected to my box, someone started to exploit the SQL injection vulnerability on my server!

63.217.168.90 - - [16/Jun/2014:04:43:00 -0500] "GET /form/frm_boa-grabber_sub.php?bot_guid=&lm=3&dt=%20where%201=2%20union%20select%20@a:=1%20from%20rep1%20where%20@a%20is%20null%20union%20select%20@a:=%20@a%20%2b1%20union%20select%20concat(id,char(1,3,3,7),bot_guid,char(1,3,3,7),process_name,char(1,3,3,7),hooked_func,char(1,3,3,7),url,char(1,3,3,7),func_data)%20from%20rep2_20140610%20where%20@a=3%23 HTTP/1.1" 200 508 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)"

Although the query did not return any meaningful data to the attacker (only data collected from sandboxes), it raises some legal questions.

Which company/organization has the right to attack my server?

police (having a warrant)
military (if we are at war)
spy agencies (always/never, choose your favorite answer)
CERT organisations?

But, does an AV company or security research company has the legal right to attack my server? I don't think so... The most problematic part is when they hack a server (without authorization), and sell the stolen information in the name of "intelligence service". What is it, the wild wild west?

The SQLi clearly targets the content of the stolen login credentials. If this is not an AV company, but an attacker, how did they got the SpyEye dropper? If this is an AV company, why are they stealing the stolen credentials? Will they notify the internet banking owners about the stolen credentials for free? Or will they do this for money?

And don't get me wrong, I don't want to protect the criminals, but this is clearly a grey area in the law. From an ethical point of view, I agree with hacking the criminal's servers. As you can see, the whole post is about disclosing vulns in these botnet panels. But from a legal point of view, this is something tricky ... I'm really interested in the opinion of others, so comments are warmly welcome.

On a side note, I was interested how did the "attackers" found the SpyEye form directory? Easy, they brute-forced it, with a wordlist having ~43.000 entries.

(Useless) Cross site scripting

Although parts of the SpyEye panel are vulnerable to XSS, it is unlikely that you will to find these components on the server, as these codes are part of the install process, and the installer fails to run if a valid install is found. And in this case, you also need the DB password to trigger the vuln...

Session handling

This is a fun part. The logout button invalidates the session only on the server side, but not on the client side. But if you take into consideration that the login process never regenerates the session cookies (a.k.a session fixation), you can see that no matter how many times the admin logs into the application, the session cookie remains the same (until the admin does not close the browser). So if you find a session cookie which was valid in the past, but is not working at the moment, it is possible that this cookie will be valid in the future ...

Binary server

Some parts of the SpyEye server involve running a binary server component on the server, to collect the form data. It would be interesting to fuzz this component (called sec) for vulns.

Log files revealed

If the form panel mentioned in the SQLi part is installed on the server, it is worth visiting the <form_dir>/logs/error.log file, you might see the path of the webroot folder, IP addresses of the admins, etc.

Reading the code

Sometimes reading the code you can find code snippets, which is hard to understand with a clear mind:

$content = fread($fp, filesize($tmpName));
if ( $uptype === 'config' )
    $md5 = GetCRC32($content);
else $md5 = md5($content);
....
<script>
if (navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Mozilla/4.0") != -1) {
        alert("Your browser is not support yet. Please, use another (FireFox, Opera, Safari)");
        document.getElementById("div_main").innerHTML = "<font class=\'error\'>ChAnGE YOuR BRoWsEr! Dont use BUGGED Microsoft products!</font>";
}
</script>

Decrypting SpyEye communication

It turned out that the communication between the malware and C&C server is not very sophisticated (Zeus does a better job at it, because the RC4 key stream is generated from the botnet password).

function DeCode($content)
{
        $res = '';
        for($i = 0; $i < strlen($content); $i++)
        {
                $num = ord($content[$i]);
                if( $num != 219) $res .= chr($num^219);
        }
        return $res;
}

Fixed XOR key, again, well done ...

This means that it is easy to create a script, which can communicate with the SpyEye server. For example this can be used to fill in the SpyEye database with crap data.

import binascii
import requests
import httplib, urllib

def xor_str(a, b):
    i = 0
    xorred = ''
    for i in range(len(a)):
        xorred += chr(ord(a[i])^b)
    return xorred
            
b64_data= "vK6yv+bt9er17O3r6vqPnoiPjZb2i5j6muvo6+rjmJ/9rb6p5urr6O/j/bK+5uP16/Xs7evq9ers7urv/bSo5u316vXs7evq/a6v5pq/trK1/bi4qbjm453j6uPv7Or9tr/u5um+uuvpve3p7eq/4+vsveLi7Lnqvrjr6ujs7rjt7rns/au3vOa5sre3srW8s7q2tr6p4Lm3tLiw4LmuvKm+q7Spr+C4uPu8qbq5ub6p4Li4vKm6ubm+qeC4qb6/sq+8qbq54LiuqK+0tri0tbW+uK+0qeC/v7So4L+1qLqrsuC+trqyt7ypurm5vqngvb24vqmvvKm6ubm+qeC9/aivuq/mtLW3srW+"
payload =xor_str (binascii.a2b_base64(b64_data), 219) 
print ("the decrypted payload is: " + payload)
params = (binascii.b2a_base64(xor_str(payload,219)))
payload = {'data': params}
r = requests.post("http://spyeye.localhost/spyeye/_cg/gate.php", data=payload)

Morale of the story?

Criminals produce the same shitty code as the rest of the world, and thanks to this, some of the malware operators get caught and are behind bars now. And the law is behind the reality, as always.

arin.

30 August 2020

HTML5 Games On Android

Blockchain Decentralized Application Hacking Course - A Journey Into Smart Contract Hacking And DApp Penetration Testing (Web 3.0)

Smart Contract Exploitation and Hacking Course Announcement

What Is this:

CTF Exam:

Bug Bounty of Sorts:

Pre- Requisites:

Contact Info:

Intro Video:

Course Outline / Release Order:

Orange = = Whats included additionally for the full course

Blue = = What will be released free in blogs / videos

(Mostly every Mondays) over the next few months

Related news

29 August 2020

APT Hackers Exploit Autodesk 3D Max Software For Industrial Espionage

Related news

Attacking Financial Malware Botnet Panels - SpyEye

Boring vulns found (warning, an almost exact copy from the Zeus blog post)

SQL injection

(Useless) Cross site scripting

Session handling

Binary server

Log files revealed

Reading the code

Decrypting SpyEye communication

Morale of the story?

Related news

about me

support arin in Radiant ministry

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